









Contemporary security studies increasingly focus on the connections between the problematic of 
security and political theology (see Dillon 2016; Stevens 2015; Troy 2013; Hell 2009; more generally 
Esposito 2015).1 This interest is not merely antiquarian, insofar as we understand secularization not 
as the abandonment of theological notions but their transfer to new domains that leaves their logic 
intact (Agamben 2007: 77). From this perspective, the inquiry into the theological origins of the 
principles, rationalities and apparatuses of security will also enable more effective critical 
interventions that problematize and transform the existing apparatuses of security.  In this article 
we shall address the implications of the ongoing ‘messianic turn’ in political thought for our 
rethinking and revaluation of security.  
 
This turn, associated with the work of Jacques Derrida (1994) and Giorgio Agamben (2005) as well 
as the revival of interest in the thought of Walter Benjamin (1968, 1978), is usually understood in 
terms of affirmation and anticipation of radical novelty, the advent of the (wholly) Other and the 
suspension of the existing order of things. At first glance, this form of thinking is distant from the 





problematic of security and its canonical formulations in political philosophy. Nonetheless, we shall 
demonstrate that the affirmation of the messianic is at the heart of what is probably the most 
influential text of the modern problematic of security – Thomas Hobbes’s Leviathan ([1651] (1985)). 
Drawing on Agamben’s recent reinterpretation of Hobbes in Stasis (2015), we shall attempt to 
restore the messianic dimension to the discourse on security. We shall argue that in the messianic 
approach security does not figure as an unquestionable good or as a necessary (or even 
unnecessary) evil but rather as the problematic aspiration, whose failure itself brings about the 
messianic event in an oblique manner, ‘like a thief in the night’. Rather than denounce or renounce 
security, the messianic approach retains it as a demand at the same time as it maintains the 
impossibility of its fulfilment. The state’s claim to provide security thus becomes the effective means 
of its undoing. 
 
Our objective in this article is not to endorse or reject these claims but demonstrate the logic, 
consistency and originality of Agamben’s messianic transvaluation of security. In particular, we shall 
focus on the way this approach goes beyond the opposition between the katechontic valorization 
of security and the accelerationist affirmation of insecurity. While in contemporary discussions 
security either continues to be affirmed as desirable despite the possible failures of the existing 
apparatuses or is problematized as itself the source of insecurity, the messianic discourse affirms 
and demands security precisely because it knows its attainment by the existing apparatuses to be 
impossible. What messianic politics thereby seeks is only security from the existing apparatuses that 
are undermined by the demands they could not possibly fulfil. This affirmation of ‘security from 




good and the dissociation of this good from the structures and institutions that have derived their 
legitimacy from claiming to provide it.  
 
In the first section we shall introduce Agamben’s reading of Hobbes’s Leviathan from the messianic 
perspective. While Hobbes’s Commonwealth has been traditionally read as a secularized version of 
the katechon, a force that restrains the anomie and violence of the state of nature while drawing 
on its resources (cf. Schmitt 2003; Rasch 2007; Dillon 2015), in Stasis Agamben argues that the 
Leviathan was never presented by Hobbes as the katechon restraining the Antichrist and thereby 
delaying the Kingdom of God. In his reading, the Hobbesian state is neither the analogue of God’s 
Kingdom on earth nor the katechon that delays its arrival, but simply what must be removed for the 
latter to be possible. Rather than read Hobbes’s theory in the familiar terms of the exchange of 
liberty for security, Agamben insists that the Hobbesian Commonwealth ensures no such tradeoff 
and the Leviathan and Behemoth, nomos and anomie, remain entwined to the point of indistinction 
in every secular order. Insofar as it is not and cannot be the Kingdom of God, the security state is 
forever resigned to the insecurity of stasis. 
 
In the second section we shall elaborate Agamben’s argument in the context of contemporary 
transformations in the governmental rationalities of security that increasingly shirk the katechontic 
function, problematize the costs and inefficiency of security apparatuses, and seek to devolve both 
the costs and provision of security to the subjects themselves through privatization, 
responsibilization and the ethics of resilience. The privatization, devolution or abolition of many of 
the security functions of the state do not entail its withering away but rather its maintenance as a 




katechon. In this context of insecurity without end, Agamben’s reading of Hobbes as a messianic 
thinker affirming the finitude of Leviathan is particularly timely as it makes it possible to understand 
how insecurity is neither the contingent effect of the state nor its necessary feature but the 
condition of its undoing.  
 
In the third section we elaborate this claim in a discussion of Agamben’s juxtaposition of Hobbes 
with Walter Benjamin. For Benjamin, profane apparatuses of security actually assist the coming of 
the messianic precisely ‘by being profane’, by perpetually failing to attain the security that they 
claim to provide. The messianic discourse on security neither affirms a true or better security nor 
comes to terms with insecurity. Instead, it undermines the existing apparatuses of security by 
demanding what they could not possibly deliver. Agamben relies on Paul’s claim in the First letter 
to the Thessalonians about the coming of inescapable destruction in the midst of apparent ‘peace 
and security’ to discredit every claim of constituted authority to fulfil its self-appointed mission. This 
exposure of the necessary indistinction between Leviathan and Behemoth in the messianic logic 
thus affirms nothing but security from the security apparatuses themselves, promising relief from 
the danger to which we are resigned in the name of security. In the conclusion we shall address the 
relation of this demand for the impossible to the advent of the messianic kingdom and discuss the 
possible nature of this kingdom itself. 
 





Agamben’s reading of Hobbes in Stasis goes beyond his earlier treatment of Hobbes in Homo Sacer 
(1998: 15-29) and The Time that Remains (2005b: 109-110). In these earlier works he interpreted 
Hobbes’s political thought as the epitome of the katechontic logic in its secularized form. The 
katechon, an obscure figure from Paul’s Second Letter to the Thessalonians (2 Thessalonians 2: 6-
7), is a force that withholds both the advent of the Antichrist and the Second Coming that will 
succeed it (see Agamben 2017; Hell 2009; Prozorov 2012). There are continuing debates in theology 
about both the authorship of the Second Letter and the meaning of the concept of the katechon in 
it, especially as the term does not occur anywhere else in the Scripture (see Best 1972; Jones 2005). 
From Tertullian onwards the katechon has been identified with the Roman Empire, a worldly power 
that delays the end of days and secures public order. For Carl Schmitt, who brought the concept of 
the katechon into late-modern political-philosophical discourse in his Nomos of the Earth (2003), 
the idea of the katechon endowed Christianity with a historical dimension, serving as the ‘only 
bridge between the notion of an eschatological paralysis of all human events and a tremendous 
historical monolith like that of the Christian empire of the German kings’ (Schmitt 2003: 60; see also 
Hooker 2009: 49-54; de Wilde 2013; Hell 2009).  
In Agamben’s Time that Remains, Hobbes’s Leviathan was presented as the paradigm of the 
katechontic logic that has since the Holy Roman Empire been replicated in every theory of the state, 
‘which thinks of it as a power destined to block or delay catastrophe’ (Agamben 2005b: 110). 
Nonetheless, in Stasis Agamben offers a startling reinterpretation of Leviathan in anti-katechontic, 
eschatological terms, eventually bringing him into alignment, if not an outright alliance, with Walter 
Benjamin, the key thinker in the contemporary revival of messianic thought: 
For Benjamin, too, the kingdom of God makes sense only as the eschaton and not as 




autonomous with respect to it. Nonetheless, neither for Benjamin nor for Hobbes, 
does profane politics have, with respect to the Kingdom, any ‘katechontic’ function: 
far from holding back its advent, it is, to the contrary, Benjamin writes, ‘a category of 
its most unobtrusive approach’. (Agamben 2015: 53) 
 
Let us reconstitute Agamben’s line of argumentation. In the second part of his essay on Hobbes in 
Stasis he poses the question of why Hobbes entitled his book Leviathan – a question that in 
Agamben’s view no one has yet answered in a satisfactory manner. It is indeed somewhat counter-
intuitive to call the Commonwealth by the name of the monster with distinctly demonic 
connotations that Hobbes could not possibly have been unaware of. While Schmitt infamously read 
the choice of the name as a product of the ‘fine sense of English humour’ (Schmitt 2008: 94), 
Agamben takes the choice of the biblical figure of Leviathan and its association with the Antichrist 
entirely seriously. In the Talmudic tradition, Leviathan and Behemoth are primordial beasts that will 
fight each other on the messianic day and both die in the struggle, to be eventually eaten by the 
righteous on the messianic banquet - the fable Agamben addressed in an earlier book The Open (see 
Agamben 2004). In the Christian tradition, the Leviathan is strongly associated with the Antichrist, 
the anomos or ‘the lawless one’ referred in the passage on the katechon in the Second Letter to the 
Thessalonians. Agamben demonstrates this proximity with reference to the image in Liber Floridus, 
an encyclopedic compilation from 1120, assembled by Lambert of St Omer, in which the Antichrist 
seated on the Leviathan carries a striking resemblance to the image of the sovereign from Hobbes’s 
famous frontispiece. ‘The Antichrist, with a royal crown on his head, holds a lance in his right hand 
(just as Hobbes’s Leviathan holds a sword), while the left hand performs the gesture of benediction 




His feet touch the spine of the Leviathan, represented as a long-tailed dragon partially submerged 
in water. The inscription above stresses the eschatological significance of both the Antichrist and 
the monster: Antichristus sedens super Leviathanum serpentum diabolum signantem, bestiam 
crudelem, in fine.’ (Agamben 2015: 43)  
 
The discovery of this striking resemblance provides a point of departure for Agamben’s re-
interpretation of Hobbes’s own text in eschatological terms, focusing on the less often discussed 
third part of the book, ‘On the Christian Commonwealth’, which has tended to ‘embarrass’ modern 
readers who have devoted surprisingly little commentary to it (Agamben 2015: 46). Rather than 
view the Kingdom of God metaphorically as the condition proper to the afterlife, Hobbes asserts 
that this Kingdom is a real entity that Christ will restore at the end of time: ‘I find the Kingdome of 
God to signifie in most place of Scripture a Kingdome properly so named, constituted by the Votes 
of the People of Israel in peculiar manner; wherein the chose God for their King by Covenant made 
with him, upon Gods promising them the possession of the land of Canaan.’ (Hobbes [1651] (1985): 
442). It is a real kingdom, in which God reigned not merely over all beings but also commanded, in 
a literal sense, such ‘peculiar subjects’ as Adam, Noah and his family, Abraham, Moses and others, 
with whom he spoke and made covenants. It is this real kingdom with God as its real king that will 
be restored after the Second Coming and it will be restored here on Earth and not in heaven (ibid.: 
480-484).  
And when our Saviour Christ by the preaching of his ministers, shall have perswaded 
the Jews to return, and called the Gentiles to his obedience, then shall there be a new 




without any necessity evident in the Scripture, that man shall ascend to his happiness 
any higher than God’s footstool the Earth. (Ibid.: 482. Emphasis original.) 
 
The analyses of the civil Commonwealth in the preceding chapters of Leviathan are therefore only 
valid until the second coming of Christ, after which a different kind of kingdom takes hold, for all 
eternity. The two kingdoms are perfectly autonomous and only coordinated from the eschatological 
perspective: ‘both take place on earth and the Leviathan will necessarily disappear when the 
Kingdom of God is realized politically in the world.’ (Agamben 2015: 48). The kingdom of the ‘world 
to come’ is not ‘of this world’, but this only means that this world and its kingdoms will have to 
disappear for the ‘new Earth’ to take their place: ‘This is that World, wherein Christ, coming down 
from Heaven, in the clouds, with great power and glory, shall send his Angels, and shall gather 
together his elect, from the four winds, and from the uttermost parts of the Earth, and thence forth 
reign over them (under his Father) Everlastingly.’ (Hobbes [1651] (1985): 495, see also ibid.: 514-
515) 
 
Thus, Agamben challenges Schmitt’s (2008) reading of Hobbes from the katechontic perspective and 
corrects his own earlier association of Hobbes’s theory with the secularization of the katechontic 
logic: ‘in Hobbes’s ‘Christian Politiques’ the State cannot in any way have the function of a power 
that restrains and holds back the end of time, and indeed is never presented in this perspective; on 
the contrary, as in the scriptural tradition that Hobbes perhaps ironically reclaims against a Church 
which seems to have forgotten it, the end of time can take place at any instant and the State not 
only does not act as a katechon, but in fact coincides with the very eschatological beast which must 




secularize the notion of the katechon, Hobbes performs the opposite gesture of articulating the 
Leviathan and the Kingdom of God in an eschatological relation: ‘the first will necessarily have to 
disappear when the second one is realized.’ (Ibid.: 52) 
 
From this perspective, the paradoxes of Hobbes’s discourse on the commonwealth that Agamben 
earlier identified in Homo Sacer become far more comprehensible. The impossibility to fully 
separate the state of nature from the civil state of the commonwealth, whereby the former survives 
in the latter in the form of the state of exception (1998: 35-36, 105), only testifies to the transitory 
and ultimately unsuccessful character of the commonwealth as the project of attaining unity and 
peace, tranquility and security. Until the Kingdom of the God at the end of time ‘no real unity, no 
political body is actually possible: the body political can only dissolve itself into the multitude and 
the Leviathan can only live together up until the end with Behemoth – with the possibility of civil 
war.’ (Agamben 2015: 49) The anomie of the state of nature is never transcended with the 
institution of the Commonwealth: in fact, the ‘natural’ state is itself nothing other than the 
projection into the past of the real condition of civil war that defined the state in Hobbes’s present 
and continues to do so in many states today. Rather than restrain the anomos that precedes the 
advent of the Kingdom of God, the state in this interpretation is the anomos, whose sovereign power 
never succeeds in overcoming war, violence and disorder but persists in producing them in the very 
guise of the acts of protection for which it demands obedience (Agamben 2005b: 111). The 
centrality of the anomic state of exception to any state, however normal, stable or law-governed, 
which Agamben asserted in his earlier works, is in Stasis restored back to the foundational text of 
the modern theory of sovereignty. Everything that the katechontic tradition sought and even 




Kingdom that will succeed it. The Leviathan will never defeat Behemoth – until the last day the two 
are locked in a battle, in which they are destined to die and be consumed at the messianic banquet. 
This is why the state is resigned to stasis, which, contrary to the katechontic logic, does not serve to 
restrain an even greater evil, but rather forms the necessary backdrop of any attempt to attain 
peace and security.  
 
‘While People are Saying ‘Peace and Security’…’ 
 
Agamben’s reinterpretation is an important intervention not only in Hobbes scholarship but in the 
political theory of security more generally, insofar as it displaces the very terms in which political 
theology has been addressed in critical discourses on security thus far. Even though the notion of 
the katechon is rarely discussed explicitly in the context of security studies (for exceptions see Dillon 
2016; Hell 2009; Rasch 2007), the katechontic logic has long been the object of critical discussion 
even when not mentioned by name. In this discourse the state’s claim to provide security, prevent 
anomie and chaos and pacify the polity inevitably ends up producing more violence and insecurity, 
because the state can only withhold anomie by appropriating and deploying it against itself. 
Moreover, as critical security studies, and especially feminist and postcolonial approaches have 
emphasized, the state’s policies advanced in the name of security have consistently undermined the 
security of the most vulnerable populations (be they women, minorities, children or the poor), 
exposing them to the destruction of vital infrastructures and ways of life if not outright violence (see 
e.g. Hudson 2005; Stern and Öjendal 2010). The politics of security will therefore necessarily rely on 
insecurity as its instrument and produce insecurity as its effect. In the more political realist versions 




with as (one more) aspect of the tragedy of the human condition (cf. Paipais 2016, chapter 5). In 
this more traditionally ‘Hobbesian’ reading, relative safety attained at a certain cost to our liberty is 
the best we can hope for in this world, in which true salvation is unattainable (see Rasch 2007). In 
the more progressive or radical versions, the necessary entanglement of security and insecurity 
serves as sufficient reason to problematize the desire for security as such, dismissing ‘securitization’ 
as a strategy for removing an issue from the domain of democratic politics into a grey zone of 
unaccountable decisionism (cf. Neocleous 2011; Neocleous and Rigakos 2011). The Hobbesian social 
contract is thus dismissed as a bad deal, in which the sovereign keeps accumulating its power and 
using force, resigning us to insecurity in the name of the very promise of security that led to its 
institution (cf. Neocleous 2008). While both of these readings are based on the katechontic reading 
of Hobbes, albeit evaluating it differently, Agamben’s reinterpretation permits us to go beyond the 
dualism between the valorization and the renunciation of security that it has inspired. 
 
The eschatological reading of the relation between the Commonwealth and the Kingdom of God 
resonates with the at first glance anti-Hobbesian messianism of Walter Benjamin, for whom the 
Kingdom of God was, famously, not the goal of history but its end (Benjamin 1978: 312). The 
Kingdom can never be brought about or delayed by any historical actor or action, but will only 
manifest itself in the termination of the historical process altogether. And yet, for Benjamin the 
historical or the profane is not completely unrelated to the coming of the Kingdom, but is rather the 
category of its ‘quietest approach’ (ibid.). While Benjamin’s text is notoriously elliptic, Agamben’s 
reinterpretation of Hobbes actually helps understand this point. ‘The Leviathan-state, which must 
ensure the ‘safety’ and ‘contentments of life’ of its subjects, is also what precipitates the end of 




should render it legitimate. It is precisely the understanding of this failure as necessary and 
inescapable that underlies the messianic disposition. At the very end of Stasis Agamben makes an 
allusion to Paul’s famous claim in the First Letter to the Thessalonians, the consideration of which 
will help us understand the messianic approach to security: ‘For you are fully aware that the day of 
the Lord will come like a thief in the night. While people are saying, “Peace and security,” destruction 
will come upon them suddenly, like labor pains on a pregnant woman, and they will not escape. But 
you, brothers, are not in the darkness so that this day should overtake you like a thief.…’ (1 
Thessalonians 5:3, cited in Agamben 2015: 53) 
 
While this passage has been interpreted in many ways throughout history, an all but literal reading 
would be most helpful for our purposes. While the authorship of the Second Letter remains 
disputed, there is an evident connection between the passage on the katechon in the Second Letter 
and the claim about the Second Coming in the First. While the katechon holds back the Second 
Coming, its claim to provide peace and security remains a false promise and the divine judgment 
will arrive unpredictably yet inescapably. Only the members of the messianic community are not ‘in 
the darkness’: they know that the claim of Leviathan to provide security is worthless, that the 
katechon is null and the state remains pregnant with the destruction that it vainly seeks to contain. 
It matters little whether this destruction is something that comes upon the state from the outside 
or something the state itself unleashes in response to a perceived, imagined or fabricated threat. 
What matters is simply that the katechontic claim is not credible: no worldly apparatus of security 
could possibly produce what it promises. This is why the self-appointed katechon ought to be 
‘removed’ as Paul says in 2 Thessalonians 2 (see Agamben 2005b: 111) - at the very least, removed 




what is possible. And yet, if the katechon is void, how can it also ‘precipitate’ the end of time? If the 
state has no delaying or restraining force whatsoever, does it perhaps possess the opposite force of 
accelerating what the katechon must delay and thereby helping bring about that which must 
succeed it? 
 
In Schmitt’s thought, the katechon and the accelerator are diametrically opposed figures: whereas 
the katechon makes history possible to begin with by delaying the Second Coming and establishing 
durable structures of political order, the accelerator speeds it up towards its inevitable end, 
destabilizing and dissolving these structures in the process, sometimes even against its own will (cf. 
Schmitt 1995; 2003: 59-60). While the Schmittian concept of the accelerator is rarely addressed in 
the non-specialist literature (see Hell 2009; Hooker 2009: 49; Dillon 2015: 214-17) the same cannot 
be said about the logic of acceleration more generally, which is central to contemporary debates in 
critical social and political theory (Noys 2010, 2014). Anti-capitalist accelerationism follows 
canonical Marxism in the belief that capitalism will collapse under the weight of its own 
contradictions and affirms a politics that would accelerate this process, exacerbating the 
contradictions in question and thereby hastening the collapse of capitalist order. The belief in 
accelerating the collapse of the social order through the exacerbation of its own contradictions also 
characterizes contemporary European anarchism, e.g. the writings of Tiqqun (2010) or the Invisible 
Committee (2009), both strongly influenced by Agamben’s thought: ‘In reality, the decomposition 
of all social forms is a blessing.’ (The Invisible Committee: 42) Yet, the accelerationist disposition 
need not be restricted to the revolutionary or anarchist Left. In their own ways, both Nietzsche and 
Heidegger affirmed the full traversal of modern nihilism as the sole condition for its overcoming in 




power’ (see Nietzsche 1968; Heidegger 1991). In a more explicitly political-theological discourse, 
Jacob Taubes contrasted his own disposition to Schmitt’s katechontic ethos by explicitly invoking 
the acceleration of the apocalypse: ‘I can imagine, as an apocalyptic: let it go down. I have no 
spiritual investment in the world as it is.’ (Taubes 2004: 103) The accelerationist disposition is thus 
an important part of the Western ontopolitical tradition that has served as an explicit or implicit 
antagonist of the arguably more dominant katechontic disposition. What is common to different 
strands of accelerationism is their impatience with the katechon and its politics of restraint, which 
keeps at bay the danger that accelerationism views as pregnant with possibility. 
  
While katechontic and accelerationist logics appear mutually exclusive, contemporary tendencies in 
security governance worldwide rather point to their paradoxical indistinction or even mutual 
destitution (see de Larrinaga and Doucet 2010; Kinnvall and Svensson 2014; Nadesan 2010). The 
universalization of economic rationality that underlies neoliberal governmentality makes 
everything, including security, a scarce good that cannot be guaranteed for everyone at any cost. 
On the contrary, it is precisely the cost of security that becomes problematized in this logic of 
governance, which, to become more cost-effective, increasingly prescribes devolution and 
privatization of security provision both domestically and internationally, the ‘responsibilization’ of 
individuals and communities with the assurance of their own security, the proliferation of private 
insurance schemes in security policies, etc. (Aradau and van Munster 2007; Leander and van 
Munster 2007; Dillon 2007; Rose 2001; Cruikshank 1999). In all these policies the state functions 
paradoxically as katechon and accelerator at once, which does not bode well for either of the 
functions (Hooker 2009: 56-7). While the confluence of the two logics in historical policies or persons 




efforts of a state to avert disaster only ended up exacerbating it. This is why in his 1942 discussion 
of the Nazi ‘spatial revolution’ Schmitt speaks of the USA, which failed to act as the successor to the 
British Empire and thereby appropriate its katechontic function, as the ‘accelerator against its will’ 
(Beschleuniger wider Willen), leading the international order to its unravelling (Schmitt 1995: 436; 
see also Hell 2009: 305). Thus, while the confluence of katechon and accelerator is not entirely 
unprecedented (see also Dillon 2016: 214-217), the precedents in question are quite ominous. 
 
While continuing to be obsessed with security as a scarce good, the neoliberal state no longer posits 
its own function in the katechontic terms of restraint or delay. Instead, it simply seeks to manage 
things as they are, with no end in sight in both senses of the word, there being no ultimate goal of 
government and no recognition of its finitude. Insofar as it posits efficiency as its highest and 
conditional value, in terms of which security apparatuses may be problematized, it also participates 
in the accelerationist paradigm, yet the acceleration in question does not pertain to the attainment 
of any end but solely to the speed at which the apparatuses of security are running, even if they 
happen to be running on empty. If the katechon ventures to maintain order at any cost, the 
neoliberal state first inquires into what the costs actually are, how they can be minimized or 
transferred onto the client to be secured. The neoliberal state may therefore be termed a post-
security state, not because it relinquishes the katechontic function, but rather because in its concern 
with its own efficiency it loses sight of the effects it was meant to produce. In the post-security state, 
the katechon who does not delay any end joins forces with the accelerator who does not have any 
end in view. Critical studies of neoliberalism that emphasize its ‘zombie-like’ status as ‘dead but still 
dominant’, repeatedly surviving every proclamation of its demise albeit in an ever more 




government - its drivenness with no direction and hence no possible end, only a perpetual 
imperative for acceleration.  
 
This indistinction of katechon and accelerator has resulted in a certain relativization of the very 
value of security: as the neoliberal emphasis on responsibilization, flexibility and resilience testifies, 
too much security, e.g. in the spheres of finance, employment or welfare, may actually be a bad 
thing (Chandler 2012; Aradau 2014; Walker and Cooper 2011). The model of agency that this 
governmental rationality affirms does not presuppose a quasi-Hobbesian subject who trades (part 
of) its liberty for security and then proceeds about its business enjoying its new-found security. The 
responsible and resilient subject must instead make its security its business: come to terms with a 
perpetual presence of insecurity, invest in insuring oneself against it, learn to bounce back after 
suffering from it, etc. In this manner, the apparatuses of the Leviathan have not only learned to 
coexist with Behemoth, but also succeeded in making this coexistence the basis of a veritable ‘ethics’ 
of eternal insecurity.  
 
In his theological genealogy of government in The Kingdom and the Glory (2011), Agamben 
addressed this occlusion of the eschatological dimension in modern government with the help of a 
striking example from Christian theology that resonates with the contemporary discussions of 
‘zombie neoliberalism’. The divine government of the world in Christianity has always been 
structurally limited in time, lasting from the creation to the end of the world. After the Last 
Judgment, the providential machine of government with its billions of angels comes to a halt and all 
that remains for them to do is sing the praises of God. The secularization of this governmental 




katechontic strategy of prolonging history indefinitely, but it kept on reappearing in various versions 
of the ‘end of history’ thesis, in which eschatology reasserted itself (Kojève 1969; Fukuyama 1992). 
There is only one true exception to this principle of the finitude of the governmental order in 
Christian theology and that is hell, where, according to Thomas Aquinas, ‘[the] demons will carry 
out their judicial function as executors of the infernal punishments for all eternity. Hell is that place 
in which the divine government of the world survives for all eternity, even if only in a penitentiary 
form. This means that from the perspective of Christian theology, the idea of eternal government 
(which is the paradigm of modern politics) is truly infernal.’ (Agamben 2011: 164) In a later text, The 
Church and the Kingdom, this closure of the eschaton is traced back to the Church itself, which ‘can 
be a living institution only on the condition that it maintains an immediate relation to its end. There 
is only one legal institution that knows neither interruption nor end: hell. Will the Church finally 
grasp the historical occasion and grasp its messianic vocation? If it does not, the risk is clear enough: 
it will be swept away by the disaster menacing every government and every institution on earth.’ 
(Agamben 2012: 41)  
 
For Agamben, contemporary politics fully confirms Paul’s diagnosis in the First Letter to the 
Thessalonians. The post-security state, in which the functions of the katechon and the accelerator 
have become indistinct in the ceaseless optimization of its operations without a view to any end, 
leaves no one in the dark about the potentiality for destruction in the midst of the ostensible ‘peace 
and security’. ‘Contrary to Schmitt’s thesis, the katechon – whether it is identified with the Church 
or with the State – can neither inspire nor defer in any way the historical action of the Christians.’ 




producing nothing and at worst turning being into nothing with no less efficiency. Yet, how can this 




What would it actually mean for the Church or any other institution to grasp the messianic vocation? 
Evidently, it is not a matter of the return to the katechontic function, whereby the Church, the state 
or any other structure of authority would assume the task of preventing or delaying the ‘disaster’ in 
question. In the messianic perspective, little would be gained from a return from a ‘post-security’ 
discourse of risk, responsibilization and resilience to some ‘proper security’. The significance of 
Agamben’s reinterpretation of Hobbes in the messianic key consists precisely in demonstrating that 
the katechontic promise was void already in and for Hobbes. The contemporary developments in 
the governance of security that downgrade, diminish or devolve the katechontic function only make 
this void character painfully clear. And yet, if the katechontic claim to hold back the disaster is no 
longer credible, should we then welcome the disaster in question with open arms and even hasten 
it as the condition of possibility of our emancipation? Such an extreme version of the accelerationist 
position would locate the problem in our very desire for security, on which the state feeds on to 
justify its existence and then proceeds to convert into the production of insecurity, all in the name 
of the aversion of the greater catastrophe. Thus, wars are fought in the name of our presumably 
threatened way of life, while our rights and liberties are trampled on in the name of our physical 
survival. If it is our desire for security that leads to the production of insecurity, then perhaps this 
desire should be renounced and (at least a modicum of) insecurity should be affirmed as such (cf. 




undoing of the state and the insecurity they produce may even be embraced as the means to a 
laudable end (see e.g. Tiqqun 2010).  
 
In contrast to such an apocalyptic accelerationism, Agamben’s Benjaminian messianism does not 
endow insecurity, anomie or violence with any positive value. The ‘danger’ that grows carries no 
‘saving power’ in itself. The affirmation of insecurity over security ends up in a fatal contradiction, 
since it was precisely the production of insecurity in the name of security that was the problem in 
the first place. If we desire security, we could not possibly affirm its opposite. Yet, if we happen, for 
some reason, to desire insecurity, then we do not seem to have a problem because our apparatuses 
of security already provide more than enough of it to go around. A critique of security would thus 
find itself with precious little to criticize. Once again, Agamben’s reading of Hobbes demonstrates 
why this is the case. It is impossible to ‘choose’ Behemoth over Leviathan, because the two are 
perpetually locked together in a single structure of the state of exception and thus remain strictly 
indistinguishable. One gains nothing by opting for the Antichrist over the katechon, because the 
katechon is already mounting the Leviathan in the pose familiar from Hobbes’s frontispiece. Just as 
every form of Luciferianism or Satanism produces nothing but a hideous parody of the religion it 
denounces, the historical movements that sought to overthrow the state inevitably produced its 
uglier replica, intensifying the very mechanisms of violence that they denounced in it. Agamben has 
argued that this repeated failure of revolutionary movements is due precisely to their continuing 
attachment to the idea of law and statehood, even when posited in the inverted terms of 
revolutionary violence: ‘Politics has suffered a lasting eclipse because it has been contaminated by 
law, seeing itself, at best, as constituent power (that is, violence that makes law), when it is not 





Thus, the messianic disposition rejects the very terms of the frontal opposition between statism and 
anti-statism, order and chaos, security and insecurity. If the indistinction between Leviathan and 
Behemoth makes it impossible to oppose security to insecurity or the other way round, it would be 
more helpful to understand their relation as an articulation of apparent opposites: (in)security. What 
is to be negated in the messianic perspective is then this articulation as a whole, the apparatus that 
perennially fails to protect but rarely fails to attack in the name of protection. The ‘saving power’ of 
messianism proceeds not from the source of the ‘danger’ itself but as a result of its failure to protect 
anyone at all. This is why it is not a matter of renouncing security, since it is only from the perspective 
of security that the state could be judged and found wanting. This does not mean re-setting the 
apparatuses of security into motion by imagining a better, different security that they could attain 
without their negative counterpart. The insecurity that the state produces in the name of security 
must be exposed and opposed not in the name of a better security to come (or in the name of the 
insecurity that we should tolerate and come to terms with), but solely in the name of twisting loose 
from the existing apparatuses and the dangers they pose. The messianic disposition affirms neither 
a pure security that cannot be attained nor the insecurity that no one could possibly want, but rather 
security from security, safety from the harm that comes with being secured by the Leviathan that 
always uncannily resembles Behemoth.  
 
Benjamin’s elliptic claim thus becomes clearer: the profane assists the messianic not by the 
proliferation of fantasies about it, which is the surest way to keep it at bay, but, on the contrary, by 
a blunt reduction of the problem of security to the austere truth of the indistinction of Leviathan 




arrangements we inhabit are neither perfect nor even perfectible, that they cannot deliver what 
they promise and only strive to maintain themselves in existence, warding off their eventual 
deactivation. This is the sole and sufficient reason why these apparatuses must be rendered 
inoperative. Whatever takes their place will at least not follow this logic of producing insecurity in 
the name of security. For both Benjamin and Agamben the messianic promise is entirely contained 
in this ‘at least’. There is no vision of pure and genuine security to be attained once the katechontic 
apparatuses are removed. The only security that the messianic community can strive for is security 
from security, which is nonetheless much more than mere coming to terms with insecurity, let alone 
embracing it. At least one real threat is removed, the one that promised to protect but only 
endangered. This will have to do, since any attempt to ensure or guarantee one’s security in a better 
way will only end up reproducing the katechontic logic that got us in trouble in the first place. 
 
In his essay on Kafka Benjamin tells a fable about a conversation at an inn on the Sabbath evening, 
whose participants entertain themselves with stories about their dreams and wishes. While some 
wish for money, a son-in-law, a new bench, one beggar in the dark corner says that he wishes he 
were a powerful king in a big country. When this country would be invaded by enemies, he would 
have to flee with nothing but his shirt on. He would then have to travel through hills and forests for 
days and nights before coming to the inn in question to tell this very story. The other listeners are 
bemused and ask the beggar what he would gain if this strange wish were fulfilled. The answer is, 
of course, the shirt, which is the only thing the beggar did not have before acquiring and then swiftly 
losing his kingdom (Benjamin 1978: 134-135). While this fable may be interpreted in various ways, 
its significance in the context of messianism is the minimalist and materialist character of the 




messianic condition ‘everything will be as is now, just a little different’ (Agamben 1993b: 53), no 
momentous transformation will take place aside from a ‘small displacement’ that nonetheless 
makes all the difference (Agamben 1999a: 164). The little difference in this fable is evidently the 
shirt that certainly matters to the beggar in question and is in any case a much more tangible benefit 
than the elusive kingdom. Benjamin’s fable participates in the messianic critique of sovereignty that 
we have presented in this article by dispelling this sovereignty as an illusion. The Kingdom is lost no 
sooner than it is gained, and the king is immediately transformed into a fleeing beggar, with the 
added benefit of the shirt. We must recall that the fourth of Benjamin’s ‘Theses on the Philosophy 
of History’ opens with a quote from Hegel: ‘Seek for food and clothing first, then the Kingdom of 
God will be added unto you.’ (Hegel in Benjamin 1968, 254; cf. Vatter 2016: 122-128)  What is it that 
is added unto the beggar who lost his worldly kingdom and fled his persecutors in a newfound shirt? 
It is evidently nothing than security itself, the security from the very kingdom that only put him in 
danger, from which he is now safe, telling stories at the inn on the Sabbath evening. 
 
This minimalism is what rigorously distinguishes Agamben’s Benjaminian version of messianism 
from any political-theological discourse: it is not a matter of imagining what might happen after the 
state in a hypothetical brighter future to be built (and for the security of which many will 
undoubtedly have to be sacrificed) but simply the matter of anticipating and accelerating this ‘after’, 
without care about what is to come. Indeed, this being ‘without care’ is what Paul urged the 
members of the messianic community to be, regardless of the imminent passing away of this world. 
‘Passing away is the figure of this world. But I wish you to be without care.’ (1 Cor 7:32, cited in 
Agamben 2005b: 23) Etymologically, the word ‘secure’ derives precisely from the negation, absence 




apparatuses of security regulating this world? It is because we have come to know the destruction 
involved in every claim to establish peace and security and are no longer ‘in the dark’ about the 
intimate co-belonging of Leviathan and Behemoth. This knowledge does not make us entirely and 
irrevocably safe from every danger, but at least grants us relief from the illusory expectations from 
the existing apparatuses of (in)security. Thus, security in the messianic approach is neither valorized 
as a glorious end-state nor scornfully refused in a quasi-heroic posture. Instead, it is what we desire 
and demand but, having seen our demands lead to nothing more but insecurity, we are now content 
to be secure from. Messianic security is a modest and transient but still eminently real experience 
of relief, of being without care or at least of having one of our cares lifted off our shoulders. This is 
not the place to discuss, let alone devise, strategies or tactics of obtaining this relief, which may vary 
from the more passive ones of keeping the state preoccupied with the demands it cannot fulfil to 
the more active ones of devising ways of living beyond the demise of the state incapable of keeping 
up with these demands. ‘Sancho Panza, a sedate fool and clumsy assistant, sent his rider on ahead; 
Bucephalus outlived his. Whether it is a man or a horse is no longer so important, if only the burden 






Agamben’s reinterpretation of Hobbes draws a different lesson from Leviathan than traditional 
readings, including those critical of Hobbes. The katechontic claim to ensure peace and security that 
Hobbes’s thought is often viewed as the paradigm of is necessarily hubristic as every attempt to do 




this very failure of the katechon precipitates the advent of the messianic moment by undermining 
its status and leading to its eventual passing away. The messianic subject ventures to hasten this 
passing by demonstrating how law and violence, security and insecurity, order and disorder are 
linked in such an inextricable manner that it is impossible to oppose one to the other. It is only 
possible to oppose their articulation by demonstrating its persistent and unavoidable failure, not in 
the name of a better security under the new order but in the name of the relief from the insecurity 
of the present one. By questioning the efficacy of the katechon, by ceaselessly demonstrating the 
state’s failure to secure, by bombarding it with the demands it cannot possibly fulfil, we prepare the 
very kingdom whose advent will come ‘like a thief in the night’. The messianic disposition thus 
resonates with one of the famous slogans of 1968: by demanding the impossible, the security that 
Leviathan/Behemoth could never provide, messianic subjects act as genuine realists who have freed 
themselves from all illusions of better security and only seek security from the apparatuses of 
security themselves. This realism of the messianic orientation is particularly pronounced in the 
contemporary context of the retreat of the neoliberal state from the katechontic approach into a 
paradoxical accelerationism that is entirely devoid of any eschatological vision and only accelerates 
the operation of its own apparatuses for greater efficiency. If security is no longer even guaranteed 
by these apparatuses that instead extol the virtues of risk, responsibilization and resilience, then 
seeking security from these apparatuses is hardly an irresponsible flight of fancy or an extremist 
move, but an entirely plausible response to the increasingly visible void at the heart of the late-
modern Leviathan. The challenge that the messianic transvaluation of security offers to security 
studies is how to approach security in an affirmative manner while dissociating it from the agents 
and structures that have laid a claim to provide it and can no longer do so in a credible and legitimate 




resigning us to insecurity but must also probe the ways security and peace could be meaningfully 
affirmed outside these apparatuses and possibly against them.  
 
Yet, what about the Kingdom of God that the undermining of the apparatuses of security is 
supposed to bring about in this oblique fashion? Can the argument of messianic politics stand 
without any serious consideration of this Kingdom, which was taken rather more seriously by 
Hobbes than by contemporary thinkers in the messianic orientation (see Martinich 2003; Strauss 
2011)? Indeed, in contrast to Hobbes’s erudite speculations on the matter, Agamben’s (and 
Benjamin’s) version of messianism does not have much to say about this kingdom, other than 
maintain, with Hobbes, both its advent on this Earth and its heterogeneity to any earthly institution.   
At the same time, this messianism cannot be reduced to the mere affirmation of the open horizon 
of anticipation akin to Jacques Derrida’s (1994, 2005) valorization of the ‘to come’ that Agamben 
has criticized as ‘petrified messianism’ (Agamben 1999: 171; see also 2005b: 103). For Benjamin and 
Agamben, the messianic kingdom is not (only) characterized by the coming of the wholly other, but 
rather by the coming to an end of the self-propelling struggle between Leviathan and Behemoth, in 
which it is impossible to discern the two sides. What matters is less the appearance of the other 
than the disappearance of the same, the same old apparatus of (in)security that we have carried as 
a burden throughout history. Agamben’s messianic kingdom does not merely take place on earth 
but lacks even a ‘throne in heaven’ (Hobbes [1651] (1985): 482), its heaven being merely an ‘empty 
sky’ (Agamben 1995: 82; 2005a: 57). It is beyond the scope of this article to adjudicate whether this 
non-theistic messianism is an affront to the Judeo-Christian tradition or the expression of its 
authentic intention (cf. Dickinson 2011; Whyte 2013: 69-72; Abbott 2014: 115-118; Nancy 2008). 
What is more important is to recall what this vision of the empty heaven is advanced against - the 




the end of time with its apparatuses running on empty. Agamben’s messianism does not introduce 
any new figure into the world, but merely dispels the false images of peace and security, including 
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